Embarrassing philosophical oversight

[robinturner]

Amaaan, I really should be working on this philosophy paper. I want to send it off soon, because the journal I'm hoping will publish (Metaphilosophy) prefer hard copy by snail mail (they kindly agreed to allow me to submit by e-mail given my geographical position, but they wanted it as a Word document, and I have my pride). I'm also giving a talk soon at Middle East Technical University based on the same ideas, so I ought to get my ideas together.

I've got two problems. One is that I've revised this paper so many times I don't want to read it again. I know I'm a terrbile intellectual narcissist, but there is a limit to how much even I can read my own work without getting bored.

The other problem is more serious. I think I've discovered a big hole in the section on "Desire and the Good". This is where I argue that if we describe something as "good" in any meaningful way, it implies that it is either desirable in itself (for at least one person) or aids in the realisation of some desired state/event. The whole of the second paper in this series is based on this premise.

It seemed so obvious at the time - I couldn't think of anything which was good but was not desired by any person in any way. Silly Solri. After some posting on philosophy, it occurred to me that I can say something like "The lion is a good hunter." No one need desire that the lion hunt. I'm amazed and embarrased that it didn't occur to me before.

Now it looks like I'll have to rework "good" as a radial category or something. It's either that or slide slowly into teleology.

Aaaaaaaa!

(sound of Solri sliding into teleology)

Comments

[solri.livejournal.com]

Well, I did write that the subject concerned was not necessarily human. But what about non-sentient objects occupying this position? For example, "Rain is good for plants". Now it is true that a lot of people want plants to grow, but I don't think that this is the origin of the sentence - I think we are saying that rain is good for a plant from the plant's point of view. But of course it is extremely unlikely that a plant has a point of view as such. Either we are being anthropomorphic, or there is a substrate below desire. In fact I think this is true, and in a later paper I call it "intrinsic tendency" (to avoid using "telos"), but I really didn't want to have to get into that at this point.

Re:

[silvereality.livejournal.com]

You could attribute examples such as that to the phrase being so simple that nothing is actually being said. So in the cases where your thesis is not supported, it would be a misuse of the attribution of "good" or "bad".

I'm serious, but I know that it probably won't be useful. I doubt that claiming misuse is a fair or valid way to get rid of the opposition.