Embarrassing philosophical oversight
Friday, November 22nd, 2002 11:46 pmAmaaan, I really should be working on this philosophy paper. I want to send it off soon, because the journal I'm hoping will publish (Metaphilosophy) prefer hard copy by snail mail (they kindly agreed to allow me to submit by e-mail given my geographical position, but they wanted it as a Word document, and I have my pride). I'm also giving a talk soon at Middle East Technical University based on the same ideas, so I ought to get my ideas together.
I've got two problems. One is that I've revised this paper so many times I don't want to read it again. I know I'm a terrbile intellectual narcissist, but there is a limit to how much even I can read my own work without getting bored.
The other problem is more serious. I think I've discovered a big hole in the section on "Desire and the Good". This is where I argue that if we describe something as "good" in any meaningful way, it implies that it is either desirable in itself (for at least one person) or aids in the realisation of some desired state/event. The whole of the second paper in this series is based on this premise.
It seemed so obvious at the time - I couldn't think of anything which was good but was not desired by any person in any way. Silly Solri. After some posting on
philosophy, it occurred to me that I can say something like "The lion is a good hunter." No one need desire that the lion hunt. I'm amazed and embarrased that it didn't occur to me before.
Now it looks like I'll have to rework "good" as a radial category or something. It's either that or slide slowly into teleology.
Aaaaaaaa!
(sound of Solri sliding into teleology)
I've got two problems. One is that I've revised this paper so many times I don't want to read it again. I know I'm a terrbile intellectual narcissist, but there is a limit to how much even I can read my own work without getting bored.
The other problem is more serious. I think I've discovered a big hole in the section on "Desire and the Good". This is where I argue that if we describe something as "good" in any meaningful way, it implies that it is either desirable in itself (for at least one person) or aids in the realisation of some desired state/event. The whole of the second paper in this series is based on this premise.
It seemed so obvious at the time - I couldn't think of anything which was good but was not desired by any person in any way. Silly Solri. After some posting on
Now it looks like I'll have to rework "good" as a radial category or something. It's either that or slide slowly into teleology.
Aaaaaaaa!
(sound of Solri sliding into teleology)
no subject
Date: 2002-11-22 03:26 pm (UTC)"Your honour, my client was metonymous at the time of the incident."
"Objection! The counsel for the defence is using pragmatics!"
"Objection over-ruled."